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 When attempting to evaluate the performance of public programs, there is a big 
difference between what can be measured and what needs to be known.  To begin with, 
measurement cannot deal with the external forces that managers and executives must deal with, 
and they do so by using their own judgment and experience.  In addition, some of the most 
important considerations that drove program design and policy are sufficiently complex and 
sophisticated that they defy measurement.  Measurement seeks to be rational in an often 
irrational world.  Those who advocate performance measurement can rightly claim that they aid 
in the formulation of judgment, but they can’t claim that measurement is a substitute for 
judgment.  This is especially true in public programs which must function within a political 
system.  The realities of government budgeting and political decision-making may totally refute 
the “facts” arising out of even the most disciplined performance measurement. 
 Even within the parameters of a given program, measurement is seldom conclusive.  
There are a wide variety of programs, organizations, and individual activities including many 
professions, that simply do not lend themselves to a useful level of measurement.  Teachers may 
hope they have had had an impact and that it can be measured, but the more complex and 
sophisticated the teaching, the less certain is the capacity to measure what (if anything) has really 
been learned.  Doctors certainly use measurement for body conditions and for technical test 
results, but the essence of medicine still seems to be judgment and, undoubtedly, instinct. 
 So measurement does not necessarily produce “facts”, and it almost never reaches the 
whole range of what it is necessary for executives to understand.  It is easier and more productive 
when what is measured is output: units of production, actions completed, customers served, 
questions answered, and so forth.  J. Edwards Deming became famous, first in Japan and then in 
the rest of the world, when he showed how very precise statistical analyses of manufacturing 
processes could show how product quality and reliability could be improved.1 
 But the measurement of outcomes is considerably more difficult and less illuminating, 
and this is especially true of public programs.  Most government programs involve multiple 
organizations at two or three levels of government, sharing responsibilities, and often in conflict.  
It is a huge problem to get all of the participants to measure what is useful in ways that are 
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compatible, and coordinate the results.  And hardest of all are the attempts to measure the 
imponderables – the unexpected turn of events, the failures of understanding, the triumph of 
emotion over rationality, budget cuts, bad politics – or even the wrong people measuring the 
wrong things. 
 There is also another form of conflict often present.  For many, especially among auditors 
or political officers, “measurement” has been seen as a form of auditing or investigation.  Where 
measurement is sought as the basis for criticism, it may be used in a negative manner against 
program managers.  It then generates a high degree of guardedness and rejection, as if it were an 
adversarial audit.  The program manager may feel that performance measurement is “just another 
staff exercise”, and is not really going to be much help.  Program managers may ask “I get paid 
for my judgment.  Is your ‘measurement’ better than my judgment?”  Or they may feel that 
performance measures seldom tell them anything they did not already know. 
 In the end, the arts of performance measurement are not up to the task of providing 
realistic evaluation of programs.  Too much remains not adequately assessed or adequately 
understood.  Measurement does not necessarily produce end facts, and in the last analysis, its 
value is only realized by the exercise of judgment. But all of this cannot be used to conclude that 
efforts should not be made to evaluate the performance of public programs in ways outside of the 
judgments of their managers, and there are more substantial forms of performance evaluation 
that can be utilized.  
But first, what is program evaluation? Program evaluation is a more complex and 
systematic assessment of how well a program is working.  It consists of the following types of 
activity: 
 1.  First, a “needs” assessment: that is, a determination of what the true need is for the 
program, who it will benefit, and whether the perceived benefits are worth the cost.  For public 
programs, the question must be asked as to whether the perceived needs can better be met by 
some means other than a public program. 
 2.  Since almost all public programs are framed by some law or formal policy, it is 
necessary to evaluate whether the major public policies that define the program are current, 
realistic, feasible and “rational”, recognizing that some of the answers to these questions may be 
by political determination.  Because the justification for a program or its objectives may be 
political, it does not mean that the program is irrational.  What it does mean is that the 
interpretation of rationality and feasibility must be made in political terms. 
 3.  Evaluations of critical processes and means for program implementation must be 
made in order to serve program objectives and to identify ways to simplify them and to 
determine if they can be improved. 
 4.  Evaluations must deal with the real results of the program in terms of both outputs and 
outcomes; i. e. whether anything has changed as a result of the program activity.  These are not 
just measures; such evaluations are expected to diagnose problems beyond just measuring them, 
and to yield some ideas about how to cure problems or maximize results. 
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 5.  The results of these program evaluations must then be presented to program managers 
and their superiors, and defended. 
 6.  It is usually useful to attempt to mandate responses from these officials, and there 
should be the capacity to undertake revisions or improvements in the evaluation.  Remember, 
these responses may be managerial or political, and both views require response. 
 It should be noted that program/project management is a distinct management discipline, 
with a large population of professional practitioners, a rich literature, and a number of very 
strong and active professional associations and institutes active in the field.  It is strong 
especially in engineering, manufacturing, construction, facilities management, and information 
technology. A program can be defined as a long term, coherent set of related activities or 
projects designed to implement major policy initiatives, under the direction of a program office 
and manager.  Programs are usually multi-faceted (for example, development of a national 
highway system) and of long term duration.  A project is a finite activity dedicated to the 
achievement of specific defined goals, with a definite beginning and ending.  Projects may either 
be separate ventures such as a space science probe or one of several projects undertaken within 
the framework of a continuing program such as a series of highway construction segments.  
Projects are typically organized by task under the control of a project office having largely 
autonomous authority and funding. 2 
 There is a wide variety of government activities designated as “programs”: 
1.  Provision of customer related activities such as a social security program, health insurance, 
housing, national parks and forests, veterans hospitals, tax collection, civil and criminal 
investigation. 
2.  Facilities operation such as hospitals, parks, embassies, ports, airports, military facilities and 
research centers. 
3.  Systems development for such things as weapons systems, scientific experiments, aircraft 
design and development, transit and highway networks, or health care delivery systems. 
4.  Public regulation, including labor relations and protection, consumer product safety, nuclear 
safety regulation, environmental protections, equal opportunity and civil rights protections, and 
public utility regulation. 
5.  Research programs in such fields as agriculture, medicine, space sciences, information 
technology, transport, or international affairs. 
6.  Financial subsidy programs such as student loans, tax subsidies or penalties, small business 
promotion, environmental protection, import and export subsidies, mortgage insurance, rent 
subsidies for the poor. 
                                                 
2   See for example Kerzner, Harold, “Project Management: A Systems Approach to Planning, Scheduling, and 
Controlling”, Hoboken, N. J., John Wiley and Sons, 2003. 
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7.  National security: military capabilities, foreign relations and assistance, and homeland 
security. 
8.  Disaster assistance and recovery, both domestic and international.  
There are literally hundreds of types of public programs that can be undertaken in any 
given country, and a whole range of different organization structures have been invented to 
manage them.  There are standard government agencies, staffed by civil servants, and operating 
only under enabling statutes, and approved government procedures.  Another widely used 
organization, particularly in the People’s Republic of China, is the state owned enterprises 
(SOE), which are a blend of partial operational independence with tight government policy 
control. In many cases such as the Public Service Units in China or the government sponsored 
enterprises in the U. S. loosely controlled organizations such as universities rely on governments 
primarily for policy guidance and some funding but are financially largely on their own.  In 
China and elsewhere, there are mixed ownership enterprises, partly owned by the government 
and partly by private interests, usually with careful ground rules for the exercise of the 
government’s involvement in enterprise decisions. 3 
 The type of organization may vary substantially given the nature of the program.  The 
following delivery systems are commonly used in all governments.  In the design of a public 
program, lawmakers should recognize that they have a number of sophisticated options to choose 
from.  Program evaluation must also recognize the importance of the organizational design in 
appraising what it can and cannot do. 
1.  There is direct service provision by government civil servants in standard public agencies 
operating on detailed legal and procedural constraints. 
2.  There are programs which primarily involve direct transfer payments from the government to 
individuals. 
3.  The government may purchase from private sector organizations it supplies, equipment and 
some services.  The needs for purchase are a government decision, and the private sector 
organization has no policy responsibility. 
4.  There is the more complex contracting out of major program or project activities to the 
private sector.  Under this form of procurement, the contractor is given responsibility under the 
contract for many of the responsibilities of the program/project office itself.  In NASA and DOD 
especially, contractors have been given extensive responsibility for the design of whole systems 
(an aircraft, ship or space vehicle) including the estimated costs, schedules and technical 
performance parameters, all within the overall program goals of the supervising agency.  In other 
cases, the program office may define its requirements explicitly in the form of technical, cost and 
performance objectives, with contractors undertaking the more limited role of fabrication and 
testing.  In any event, however much responsibility is placed in the hands of contractors, the 
program officer is never relieved of the ultimate responsibility and accountability. 
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5.  The government may make grants of funds to another government unit or to a non-profit 
organization.  Government officials are responsible for determining the necessity for the grant, 
the purpose of the grant, the amounts to be paid, and for supervising compliance by the grantee 
with the terms of the grant.  Grantees are given considerable latitude and control over the manner 
of their own performance.  In addition, for more complex projects (e. g. construction of a subway 
segment), the grant instrument may be more like a contract which spells out the nature of the 
work, rules governing performance, and the right of the government to mandate specific actions 
where considered necessary.  Under this form of grant, funds may be withheld by the 
government if it is judged that grantee performance is not adequate or compliant.  In China, such 
grants are largely discretionary from the top down, are often awarded on a patronage basis to 
friends and allies, and have an unsavory history of being diverted from their intended purposes, 
as for example, from environmental protection to economic development or managerial 
perquisites. 
6.  Vouchers may be given to eligible citizens for specific purposes such as school costs or 
housing subsidies.  Government officers are responsible for determining who will be eligible, the 
amounts to be paid, and for auditing to assure that the recipients use the money for the defined 
purpose. 
7.  The government may make simple direct subsidy payments to public or private organizations. 
8.  In other cases, the government may make loans to an organization, or it may guarantee loans 
to certain organizations when they borrow from banks or other lenders.  A good example of this 
kind of program is guaranteed student loans. 
9.  Some public programs are designed to create forms of insurance for certain transactions, such 
as home mortgages. 
10.  There are literally hundreds of programs that are based on government power to regulate – 
both organizations and the actions of individuals.  Regulation may be either economic (e. g. 
public utilities or securities markets), or they may deal with the health and safety of people by 
regulating foods, drugs, air quality, water pollution, or hundreds of other potential threats. 
11.  Finally, all governments have elaborate programs for the administration of justice, from 
courts, police and public prosecutors, to anti-terrorist protection and anti-crime enforcement. 
 In a similar vein, governments have evolved many ways to finance their public programs, 
which also dictates who is responsible for evaluating a program, because each participant wants 
to guard the use of its own money.  The normal pattern is to finance each program out of the 
general revenues of the government, which may be obtained in a variety of ways, including user 
fees, service charges, private sector financing, or matching fund agreements between levels of 
government.  In some instances such as social security or highway programs, special trust funds 
are established to receive certain revenues, and these trust funds are supposed to be expended 
only for their defined purposes – but of course, they seldom are.  
 There are also a variety of ways in which a government can expend its money.  In 
addition to the normal forms of public programs, governments may create “tax expenditures” in 
which it may have legal authority to collect some revenue but chooses not to do so.  An example 
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is making mortgage payments tax deductible.  Grants of funds which are outright gifts may be 
made for certain purposes such as research, or cost sharing formulas may be arranged with 
grantees or private organizations. Both the annual budget and the tax system are famous vehicles 
by which the government can offer special advantages to some parties.  Many of these 
arrangements might be evaluated as “bad management” or poor business practice or not cost 
effective but they may be a perfectly valid response to the mandates of enabling statutes.  But it 
is reasonable to expect that governments at all levels will consider many options for the most 
cost-effective means for financing its programs, and there will be both political strategies and 
managerial tactics in selecting the optimum financing approach. In China, a major consideration 
is always which option permits the greatest retention of political authority for the minimum cost.  
These options are also important in determining the most effective program design.  One 
may argue that the intelligent selection of financing approach can save the government (or the 
tax payer) money, and thus the choice of financing is an important element of program 
performance evaluation.  
     
Key Program Management Roles and Responsibilities 
 To be able to exercise real control over a project, the project office must be responsible 
for the following: 4 
1.  Project goals, objectives and definition of outcomes.  This includes the definition of products 
or services to be achieved including money and other resources, performance requirements, 
safety and reliability standards and sequencing of activity. 
2.  Overall project control:  Even where parts of the project are let out through contract or 
delegated to others such as local governments, the central project management office remains 
fully responsible for all elements of the project including evaluation of the performance of 
contractors or local governments.  In order to do this, the project office must be staffed with 
people of high technical and managerial skill, and must act coherently in the supervision of all 
elements of the project. 
3.  Huge projects/programs such as the Three Gorges Dam project in China involve an 
extraordinary number and range of government agencies, local governments, contractors, and 
subcontractors.  The project office is responsible for the allocation of tasks to the various 
participants, and the coordination of their efforts, usually against a fixed time frame.  The project 
office must track performance, expenditure patterns, problems, threats, shortages and cost 
overruns.  The project office must formulate the overall budget proposal, and cope with the 
changes that might occur during the approval process.  The Three Gorges program is not only an 
extraordinary development in itself, but it stands as a major test of the ability of the Chinese 
government to master the skills of program/project management. 
4.  The project office will determine the “make or buy” decisions where parts of the project will 
be contracted or assigned to other organizations, usually some other government ministry or 
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local government.  In each case, the project office remains responsible for all work, and thus it 
must create to capacity to evaluate the performance of all other organizations who are partners in 
the project.  This evaluation has three characteristics.  First, it must determine whether the 
partner is properly meeting its responsibilities.  Second, the evaluation should go beyond mere 
compliance and judge the adequacy or excellence of their performance. And third, and of serious 
importance in China is a careful scrutiny to prevent all forms of corruption, especially in the 
flows of money.  It is in this arena especially that the Chinese never seemed to have achieved 
control. 
5.  Most projects are, of necessity held to a definite schedule or in fact a series of interlocking 
schedules.  Failure to do so almost always ends up in expensive project “drift” both in the total 
time to completion, and in the thousands of sub schedules for subsidiary elements of the project.  
If key scheduled dates are missed, the project office is responsible for determining what to do to 
get back on a hard schedule.  Nothing is more expensive than for the project to stretch out the 
time to completion.  One of the most important elements of schedule control is called “change 
control”.  While some change in a project is inevitable, and often desirable (i. e. technical 
improvements), the introduction of changes can be so disruptive that it they threaten the integrity 
of the project.  Therefore, at some point in time, the design or plan for the project must be 
“frozen” and no further major changes accepted. 
 6.  Finally, every project office must report to a higher level of management to report on 
progress, account for funds, and justify the current program of activity.  In China, this upward 
reporting is especially complex, since it involves not only some supervising ministry for each 
program, but also a separate, and powerful, office of the Chinese Communist Party.  The Chinese 
government practices a particularly tight form of “vertical administration” in which lower 
governments or organizations must report to the next higher level of government, right up to the 
top. 5  Given the two parallel paths of bureaucratic reporting and political reporting, and the 
excruciating level of coordination required among a multitude of players, it may be extremely 
difficult to obtain timely decisions, and even know who gets to make each decision. 
 
The Necessity for Program Evaluation 
 It is perhaps human nature that managers do not like to have other people looking over 
their shoulders or questioning their judgments, but it also true that organizations can enhance 
their results if more than one mind is at work.  It is perhaps also true that, for most politicians, 
program evaluation is not popular, since it may reveal problems that they think will be politically 
embarrassing, and often, there is a notable lack of political will or ability to address 
shortcomings.  As a result, there program evaluators may be made gun shy about challenging 
political sensitivities.  This is especially true in China, where certain laws remain that makes any 
criticism of public activities highly sensitive and therefore dangerous.  It is almost impossible to 
understand the line between acceptable criticism and “counterrevolutionary” activities which 
remain illegal.  
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Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Winter 2008, Vol. 3, No. 4, p21-31 27
Program Performance Evaluation: Judgment Versus Measurement 
But examining the nature of program management described above, it is very clear that 
simple processes of performance measurement are of only marginal value, and that even an 
occasional effort at more sophisticated performance evaluation is not enough.  What emerges is 
that performance evaluation must be thought of as a constant and ubiquitous process of judging 
and evaluating program performance in many dimensions.  In order to be effective, it must 
consider all elements of the project from the political and policy dimensions down through the 
technical, cost, schedule and human relationship imperatives.  Every program/project manager 
should be conducting his/her own internal evaluation, and various forms of evaluation can be 
“built in” to each management system.  The larger and more complex the program, the more 
sophisticated evaluation tends to become.  It should be recognized that every competitive 
contractor selection is an evaluation; that every decision about re-competing a contract is an 
evaluation; every determination about a contractor’s performance and compliance with the terms 
of the contract is an evaluation, every modification in plans or budgets must be based on 
evaluation.  In fact, it must be recognized that the judgment of managers is the greatest asset of 
all.   
 
NASA Program Management Principles 
 One of the most interesting and exciting programs of the last 50 years have been those 
pursued by the U. S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), especially in its 
early formative years.  Both its manned space flight program and its extended series of 
unmanned scientific probes in the solar system and beyond and classic examples of program/ 
project management, often at its finest as successful managerial design, often invented as 
programs were defined.  The following are brief discussions of some of the philosophy of 
management that NASA so successfully developed. 
1.  Marshalling national resources 
 NASA rejected the option of building up a huge staff of government civil servants in 
favor of programs that would be largely executed through contracting.  Further, as articulated by 
James E. Webb, NASA’s second administrator, he recognized that the journey into space would 
require not just a large government agency, but “the marshalling of all elements of American 
society including scientists, universities, industry and the American public.”  Further, he spoke 
of the need to marshal the best resources in the United States because he perceived that NASA’s 
programs would be of extraordinary technical and managerial complexity. 6 
2.  Securing the highest levels of government talent 
 NASA recognized that the direction of this massive effort of directing several manned 
space projects and scientific exploration projects along with a continuing research program 
would require the highest level of employee skills – not just adequate people, but outstanding 
people. It took excellent advantage of the lure of its new missions to attract that kind of top 
talent, despite government salaries that were not even competitive.  NASA forced the best out of 
a government personnel system designed more for constraint than for innovation. 
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Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Winter 2008, Vol. 3, No. 4, p21-31 28 
Program Performance Evaluation: Judgment Versus Measurement 
3.  Flexibility in assignment/movement of key leadership 
 NASA, under the pressure of its fast moving program, had the skill to evaluate its key 
leadership, and its administrators and program office directors did not hesitate to remove people 
who were not adequate for their jobs.  It could move swiftly to shift top people within the 
organization.  It sought and got the flexibility to hire top people from outside of government and 
did so often to obtain the best possible talent. 
4.  The primacy of the project management approach 
 NASA was built on the stable base of the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, 
and the field centers of that organization became the R & D capability of the new NASA.  But 
NASA, borrowing from the project management experience of the Defense Department, became 
an expert user of the program management style of management and an expert user of specific 
project offices housed in the field centers for institutional support.  But each project office had 
explicit authority of its own that could not be constrained by the centers.  Projects were finite in 
purpose, of specific limited time duration, possessed of independent authority and resources, and 
all powerful in their own sphere of activity.  The permanent NASA field center base helped to set 
up and staff each project, support it during its lifetime, and absorb its people as the project 
phased down. 
 In a similar vein, the complex of contractors was developed along the same lines.  That 
is, some contractors such as for data management or technical services were semi-permanent, but 
most contractors were hired and directed by the project offices, and were expected to expand or 
contract as needed during the finite life of the project.  Thus, both the civil service workforce and 
the contractor workforce were directly tied to the current needs of the project and could be 
efficiently trimmed back as those needs declined.  This was seen as far more efficient and cost-
effective than the alternative of a large standing federal workforce which could be reduced or 
shifted only with great difficulty. 
5.  Program management vs. project management 
 NASA was, at any given time, responsible for a whole series of related manned space 
flight or space science activities.  Groups of related activities were placed under the direction of 
a headquarters program manager in the agency headquarters, and then specific projects within 
the program were assigned to one or more field centers for implementation.  While these 
respective roles can and did differ in detail, it is usually felt that NASA at its best typified a 
highly successful balancing of central direction with strong but decentralized project 
management in the field centers.  This distinction was very important in the NASA culture.  The 
management in the field centers viewed their management latitude as essential to performance 
optimization, and this is one of the intangibles that no performance measurement scheme would 
ever deal with.  Conversely, even the field center leaders recognized that performance would also 
be weakened if the headquarters failed to live up to its role for planning, coordination, resource 
allocation, and conflict resolution.  This was often referred to within the agency as the “mutual 
success/failure relationship.” 
6.  The line vs. staff relationship 
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 There was a strong pattern from the beginning that the line managers –  i. e. the project 
managers – had to have the ultimate authority over their own project activities, and they should 
not be blocked or frustrated by the authority or actions of staff officials (e. g. personnel, 
accounting, finance, procurement, contract administration).  These staff offices thus had two 
kinds of roles:  to some extent, they were auditors of line manager performance and could insist 
on conformance with certain laws or regulations; but more importantly, they were service 
organizations as well, intended to support and assist the line managers.  In most conflicts 
between these authorities, the line manager was expected to prevail.  If a line manager could, 
however, be shown to have done something wrong, the fault and the consequences were clearly 
his.  In fact, most of the people in these staff offices accommodated well to the “service” nature 
of their work, and did not like the “overseer” role as much.  Staff organizations in NASA had a 
very good reputation, and produced many outstanding people. 
7.  NASA felt it to be absolutely vital to employ very disciplined and sophisticated forms of 
planning, program definition, objective setting, schedule controls, technical program evaluation 
and cost controls.  The timing and sequencing of thousands of events was estimated and 
techniques devised for tracking each and reporting their status back into a central control center.  
This sophisticated planning became an essential form of control, since the failure to meet any 
one of a series of critical time related events could be determined in advance and actions taken to 
correct looming problems.  In addition, funding could be related to program performance and 
progress.  The cost of achieving each critical event could be priced out and the cost-benefit of 
each calculated where needed.  The financial consequences of delays or failures could be 
estimated at an early point, and the program cost consequences calculate.  NASA became known 
for its very high understanding of the links and interrelationships between cost, schedule and 
technical performance.  The maintenance of large contractor staffs and facilities was extremely 
costly and any delay in a program could have drastic cost consequences.  Thus, NASA sought to 
push each program at the best possible speed, and this fast paced performance saved the 
government money in the long run – a lesson often lost in other public programs. 
8.  The demands of operating in the strange and demanding new environment of space, far from 
help, pushed NASA into an extraordinary level of concentration on reliability, safety and quality 
of performance – both for the hardware and for the people.  While many of the technical 
elements of such quality control are not transferable to other types of programs, NASA did 
demonstrate that it is possible to create strong institutional motivations for reliability and safety, 
embed such motivations into any organization, and find ways to enforce these disciplines. 7 
9. Constant program review 
 NASA developed an approach where the progress of its projects were subject to constant 
structured and disciplined review and evaluation at the highest levels of the agency.  Most of the 
reviews were done monthly in front of the whole top management team, and there at their best 
when they were frank, open and powerful.  Knowing that each project official would be exposed 
to this intense scrutiny and critique of their peers and superiors gave real muscle to these 
reviews.  This is in marked contrast to the insipid staff meetings that tend to characterize other 
agencies.  NASA people in turn subjected contractor organizations to the same kind of program 
                                                 
7  See Kraft, Chris, “Flight: My Life in Mission Control”, New York, Plume Books, 2001. 
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reviews, as well as special “tiger team” reviews dealing with serious problems.  Most contract 
managers seemed to feel the same kind of professional motivation to do well in these reviews 
that drove NASA’s own managers.  As part of this managerial style, NASA exercised its 
oversight of contractors in ways that gave them the same wide latitude and independence that 
NASA’s field offices wanted from NASA headquarters.  Performance of contractors was defined 
mostly in outcomes rather than performance specifics.  In many cases, NASA devised forms of 
incentive contracts which induced contractors to optimize certain kinds of outcomes such as 
innovation, quality, timeliness, or speed.  
 From this discussion, it should be clear that program performance evaluation is, or should 
be, a built-in element of the management of any activity.  Evaluation must be applied to every 
facet of any program, and it must be constant and demanding.  It will always be internal; from 
time to time, it may also be worth while to bring some form of external evaluation to bear.  If 
such an external performance evaluation is undertaken, it cannot be useful if it is a simplistic 
assessment by people who do not understand the technical and managerial elements of the 
program, or is merely a performance measurement technique that will not recognize most of the 
truly critical elements that make a program work. 
 
